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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2009 global stock markets, declining for five months, hit
new lows. In the United States the Dow Jones Industrial average, S & P
500 and NASDAQ had fallen 54%, 56%, and 55%, respectively. In the
United Kingdom the FTSE was down 47%.2 Markets in developing
countries seemed to weather the storm better at first and there was talk
that, perhaps, the dynamics of the global economy had changed with
developing countries being decoupled or less dependent on good
economic conditions in developed economies.3 That proved not to be
the case when markets in developing countries also began to fall.4
Politicians in the United States tried to calm the panic by telling the
people that the fundamentals of the domestic economy were sound.
The simple truth of the matter was that the fundamentals of the
domestic economy were a mess, and this became evident when on

1. CNBC, Real Time Market Quotes, "Dow Jones Industrial Average Ndex," available
at http://data.cnbc/quotes/DJLA/tab/2; CNBC Real Time Market Quotes, "S&P 500 Index,"
availableat http://data.cnbc/quotes/.SPX/tab/2; CNBC, Real Time Market Quotes, "NASDAQ
NMS Composite Index," availableat http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/COMP/tab/l?viewtype=more.
2. CNBC, Real Time Market Quotes, "FTSE 100 Index," available at http://data.cnbc.
com/quotes/GB;FTSE/tab/2.
3. The Decoupling Debate: Emerging Markets, ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 4779950.
4. Jason Subler, China Economic Data Surprises, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/09/1 1/business/business-uk-china.html;
Randall
S.
Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Central
Bank of Argentina 2008 Money and Banking Conference: The United States in the International
Financial System: A Separate Reality? Resolving Two Puzzles in the International Accounts
(Sept. 1, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2008O9Ola
.htm.
5. Alister Bull, Bush Says Economic Fundamentalsare Good, REUTERS, Dec. 4, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSWBT00802120071204.
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March 14, 2009 the U.S. government had to intervene to save the
investment bank Bear Steams, deemed too big to fail, from failing. 6
Subsequently, the investment bank Lehman Brothers was allowed to
fail and panic set in.7 The markets continued to drop and it became
apparent that there were numerous financial service firms in the United
States and abroad that were teetering on the brink of failure.
Governments around the world intervened to save the too big to fail
financial service firms due to concerns about systemic risk; the failure
of one financial service firm causing the failure of others and,
ultimately, unacceptable damages to the economy.9 This government
intervention took the form of government-backed mergers between
weak financial service firms and stronger ones, an infusion of public
funds into weak private financial services firms and governmentsponsored entities on the verge of failure and special bankruptcy rules.' 0
While this government intervention may have prevented the global
financial services disaster from becoming worse, people around the
world lost their life savings;" lost their jobs, 12 and lost their homes. 13
How this financial crisis happened is still up for debate. On a very
simplistic level we seem to have experienced market failure when there
was no market for the "innovative" financial products, mostly
securitized debt, created by the financial services sector. This created a
credit freeze depriving financial service firms of short-term loans to

6. Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, CNN MONEY, Mar. 31, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boydbear.fortune/.
7. Fang Wang et. al., The End of Lehman Brothers, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2cOc5d82-8344-1I dd-907e-000077b07658.htrl?nclickcheck-l.
8. United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2009, http://www.un.org/
esa/policy/wess/wesp2009files/wesp2009.pdf; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of
Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the National Association for Business
Economics 50th Annual Meeting: Current Economic and Financial Conditions, (Oct. 7, 2008),
availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081007a.htm.
9. Fabia Panetta, et. al., An Assessment of FinancialSector Rescue Programmes, BIS
PAPERS No. 48, 10-19 (July 2009).

10. Id. at 10; Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control
Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 146 (1986); CorporateBankruptcies in America: The Boom
in Busts, EcoNOMIST, July 4, 2009, availableat 2009 WLNR 12851000.
11. See Dow Jones, supra note 1; NASDAQ, supra note 1; S&P, supra note 1.
12. President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Economy (Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress office/RemarksofPresidentBarackObamaontheEconomy;
BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STATISTIcs,

EMPLOYMENT

SITUATION

SUMMARY

(2009),

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nrO.htm.
13. Home Mortgages, Recent Performance of Nonprime Loans Highlights the Potential
for Additional Foreclosures: Hearing Before the 1 Economic Comm. of the United States
Cong., Illth Cong. (2009) (statement of William B. Shear, Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
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service their debt, which far exceeded their assets.14 In a free market, a
firm that is not able to service its debt goes into bankruptcy or fails. But
years of deregulation coupled with consolidation in the financial
services sector due to a lack of antitrust enforcement resulted in mega
financial service firms that pose systemic risk; that is, they are too big to
fail.'"
There are currently talks going on around the world about how to fix
this problem. All focus on re-regulation of the financial services
industry to manage systemic risk.' 6 While such a move may be
advisable,' 7 we have seen in the past that, similar to the business cycle,
there is a regulatory cycle where regulations are passed, enforced,
reinterpreted, ignored, repealed and reenacted. Thus, regulations may
provide some short term stability but as discussed below they do not
eliminate the systemic risk inherent in too big to fail firms.
The only way systemic risk can be significantly reduced is to
eliminate the too big to fail problem. That is where antitrust law may
help to augment regulatory reform. Through Sherman § 2,18 firms that
are too big to fail and, thus, pose a systemic risk may face divestiture;
the breaking up of a too big to fail firm into smaller firms that pose no
such risk. Additionally, merger review under Clayton § 719 should
utilize a systemic risk analysis and merger approval should be denied if
such risk is probable.
That said, there are numerous problems to such an approach though
most are of a practical nature. For example, as an economic and
political reality, the United States cannot go the antitrust route alone, as
there are firms outside the United States that pose systemic risks.
Indeed, one reason U.S. financial services firms were allowed to
become too big to fail was so they could compete with foreign firms

14.

Bernanke, supra note 8; BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, QUARTERLY REVIEW (2008),

http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/rqt0912.pdf.
15. Albert A. Foer, Preserving Competition After the Banking Meltdown, GLOBAL
COMPETITION

POLICY,

Dec.

15,

2008,

https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/

preserving-competition-after-the-banking-meltdown.
16. International Monetary Fund, About the IMF, June 2009, http://www.imf.org/
external/about.htm; London Summit 2009, GROUP OF TWENTY, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR
RECOVERY AND REFORM (2009), http://www.g20.Org/Documents/final-communique.pdf

17. But see Stephen G. Breyer, Anticipating Antitrust Centennial: Antitrust,
Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1987)
(suggesting antitrust law may be preferable to regulatory law in a recently deregulated market).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996).
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that were also too big to fail.2 0 If, through divestiture and merger
control, U.S. firms are no longer too big to fail they may be too small to
compete. Accordingly, it is imperative that systemic risk analysis is
integrated on a global basis to break-up and prevent the existence of too
big to fail firms.
Part II of this Article provides some general definitions and some
history of the regulatory cycle. Through this view of the recent past we
can see the folly in relying solely on re-regulating the financial services
sector. Regulations are prone to deregulatory cycles and the regulatory
reform currently being discussed does not propose to eliminate systemic
risk problems; it simply tries to manage them.
Part III describes the origins of the systemic risk problem to provide
context for a systemic risk analysis. In this section, I also apply
systemic risk analysis to Sherman § 2, Clayton § 7 and the antitrust
rules articulated by the Supreme Court to show that such analysis will
work under current law without the need for legislative amendment nor
a reconsideration of the law by courts. While antitrust law in the United
States seems to be in a constant state of flux, evolving to meet economic
realities, systemic risk analysis does not require overturning precedent.
Although antitrust enforcement by governmental agencies also seems
cyclical in nature, private antitrust enforcement may eliminate this
problem.
Finally, Part IV addresses the need for a global solution for systemic
risk through harmonized antitrust laws; at least on the point of
integrating systemic risk analysis in considering divestiture and merger
issues. While, in the past, harmonization has not found favor for a
variety of reasons, the global financial services meltdown certainly
provides a motive and a starting point to reconsider this issue.

20. Congressional Record (House) (May 13, 1998) H 3124, H3132-35, H3137-38,
H3143; Congressional Record (House) (July 1, 1999 H5216-18, H5223, H5226-28, H5232,
H5235-37, H5241, H5243-44; Congressional Record (House) (Nov. 4, 1999) HI 1519, HI 1522,
Hi1525, HI1527-28, Hi1536-36, H11544, H11547-48, H11550; Congressional Record
(Senate) (May 5, 1999) S4742; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S.
FinancialServices Industry, 1975-2000: Competition,Consolidation,and IncreasedRisks, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 234-35 (2002); Sarah A. Wagman, Laws Separating Commercial Banking
and SecuritiesActivities as an Impediment to Free Trade in FinancialServices: A Comparative
Study of Competitiveness in the InternationalMarketfor FinancialServices, 15 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 999, 1005 (1994).
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II. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY CYCLE:

FROM REGULATION

TO DE FACTO DEREGULATION TO DE JURE
DEREGULATION AND BACK AGAIN

It is said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over
and over again and expecting a different result. 2 1 If that is the case then
we must ask if it is insane to think that re-regulation of the financial
services sector will solve the problem of systemic risk. As with the
business cycle of ups and downs we have seen a regulatory cycle of
regulation - deregulation - re-regulation. There is no guarantee that we

will not, yet again, de-regulate with giddy optimism of rational actors
who are, in reality, acting with irrational exuberance causing the next
fall into economic senseless despair. This section looks at the regulatory
cycle, but first I shall provide some definitions for the sake of clarity.
A. The DefinitionalProblem
In researching just what happened to cause the financial crisis it
became apparent that the complex nature of the investment transactions
was not the only confusing aspect of this crisis. The interchangeability
of terms relating to the institutions involved is a masterpiece of
confusion. So, for ease of reference I shall define some terms here
relating to the various financial service institutions involved. First, we
have the term "commercial bank." Throughout this paper that term shall
refer to banks that had a primary function, prior to legislative
deregulation, of "acceptance of demand deposits from individuals,
corporations, governmental agencies, and other banks; acceptance of
time and savings deposits; estate and trust planning and trusteeship
services; lock boxes and safety-deposit boxes; account reconciliation
services; foreign department services (acceptances and letters of credit);
correspondent services; investment advice." 22
Next we have "savings & loans" also known as "thrifts." In this
Article, the term "savings & loan" shall be used consistently
throughout. Prior to deregulation, a savings & loan's primary function
was the "safe-keeping of depositors' funds, with the resulting feature
that both their deposits and investments were generally of a more
permanent character than those of commercial banks."2 3

21. Albert Einstein, The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/Albert_
Einstein/31.
22. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 327 (1963).
23. In re Wilkins' Will, 226 N.Y.S. 415, 425 (N.Y. 1928).
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"Merchant banks" and "investment banks" are collectively defined
as:
[a]n individual or institution which acts as an underwriter
or agent for corporations and municipalities issuing
securities. Most also maintain broker/dealer operations,
maintain markets for previously issued securities, and offer
advisory services to investors. Investment banks also have
a large role in facilitating mergers and acquisitions, private
equity placements and corporate restructuring ... 24
The term "investment banks" shall be used consistently throughout this
Article.
Then there is the "secondary banking sector" also known as the
"shadow banking sector." This Article will use the term "shadow
banking" which shall be defined as institutions, primarily investment
banks, that provide unregulated financial services. For example, in the
United States a commercial bank is regulated by the Federal Reserve
regarding deposits it takes in, but an investment bank, regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the buying and selling
of securities, is not regulated when it takes in deposits for money
markets.2 6
Finally, there is the term "financial services." This term is used to
describe the collective industry of commercial banking, investment
banking and insurance.
B. The Regulatory Cycle Begins
In 1933, in response to the crash of the U.S. stock market in 1929
and subsequent bank failures, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act to
restrict the ability of commercial banks to engage in investment
banking.27 The legislative history behind the Glass-Steagall Act
indicates Congress believed that speculative investment by commercial
banks was a major cause of commercial bank failures after the stock
market crash and that the best way to avoid such problems in the future
24. Investorwords, "investment bank," http://www.investorwords.com/2602/investment_
bank.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009); Investipedia, "merchant bank," http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/m/merchantbank.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
25. Desi Franklin, The Community Reinvestment Act: Subprime Crisis Villain, or Good
and Misunderstood?, 5 No. 16 ANDREws BANKR. LITIG. REP. 9 (2008); Heidi Mandanis
Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in
Britain andthe UnitedStates, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 623 (1999).
26. Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyler, Mutual Funds, Investment Advisers, and the
NationalSecurities Markets Improvement Act, 52 Bus. LAW. 419, 421 (1997).
27. Wagman, supra note 20, at 1005.
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was to separate commercial banking from investment banking.2 1 While
there has certainly been some dispute as to the cause of the bank failures
in the 1930s 29 there is little room for doubt that banking regulation was
passed in response to that economic crisis. 30
From 1933 to around 1980, commercial bank expansion was limited
by branching restrictions that prevented interstate banking; commercial
bank competition for deposits was limited by caps on the amount of
interest that could be charged and the type of business commercial
banks could engage in was limited. 3 1 However, in the 1960s the shadow
banking sector began offering higher interest rates in its unregulated
money market accounts and commercial banks began losing
customers.32 To counter this loss of revenue, commercial banks
increased consumer and mortgage lending. 3 3 However, this mechanism
to increase revenue meant higher risk and diminished the overall quality
of bank assets.34 To further aggravate the situation, soaring oil prices
during the 1970s led the Federal Reserve to drive up interest rates to
control inflation which resulted in a hiher costs for commercial banks
and savings & loans to borrow money. This caused the short-term cost
of funding (the interest charged to commercial banks and savings &
loans to borrow money) to be higher than the return on portfolios of
mortgage loans (the interest commercial banks and savings & loans
charged its customers on loans), a large proportion of which may have
been fixed rate mortgages. 36 This problem is known as an asset-liability
mismatch and was a principal cause the savings & loan crisis in the
1980s. 37 Additionally, the 1970s saw a marked increase in competition
from foreign banks in the United States. 38

28. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971).
29. See Benjamin J. Klebaner, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: A HISTORY 138-48
(Twayne Publishers) (1990); George S. Eccles, THE POLITICS OF BANKING 81-86, 91-93 (Sidney

Hyman ed., Graduate School of Business, University of Utah 1982).
30. Klebaner, supra note 29, at 142-47; Eccles, supra note 29, at 89-97.
31.

Arthur F. Burns, THE ONGOING REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BANKING 3-6 (1988); see

Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 621, 627.
32. Schooner & Taylor, supranote 25, at 623.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Zvi Bodie, On Asset-Liability Matching and FederalDeposit and Pension Insurance,
ST. LouIs FED. RESERVE, July/August 2006, http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/

06/07/Bodie.pdf.
38. Schooner & Taylor, supranote 25, at 623.
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C. The Beginning of the DeregulationCycle
In the United Kingdom during the 1970s, the Bank of England 39
responded to the growth of the shadow banking sector and the emerging
presence of foreign institutions by deregulating domestic financial
markets.40 As a result of deregulation and loose fiscal and monetary
policies, lending, particularly in the real estate sector, rose
significantly. 4 1 When the real estate bubble in the United Kingdom
burst, a number of institutions faced serious liquidity problems, and, as
the crisis wore on, a growing number of them became insolvent. 42 The
Bank of England, along with London and Scottish clearing banks,
contributed resources to provide liquidity and bail out depositors of
insolvent institutions.4 3
Back in the United States, commercial banks sought deregulation
similar to that allowed in the United Kingdom in the 1970s in order to
expand revenue opportunities by engaging in insurance and investment
banking activities. Additionally, U.S. commercial banks sought to
curtail the competitive advantage of the growing number of foreign
banks operating comparatively unregulated in the United States. 45 U.S.
regulators were also anxious about the lack of supervision over foreign
banks.4 6 In response, Congress passed the International Banking Act of
1978 (IBA), 47 imposing domestic regulatory restrictions on foreign
commercial banks.4 8 The IBA was based on the principle of national
treatment, 4 9 a concept familiar in international law. In effect, the IBA
closed loopholes that had allowed foreign commercial banks operating
in the United States to avoid the Glass-Steagall restrictions on
investment banking activities and interstate banking limits imposed on
U.S. commercial banks.5 0
The savings & loan crisis in the United States in the 1980s ushered
in more deregulation in the United States. Because the sudden nature of
39. The central bank for the United Kingdom serves a function similar to the U.S. Federal
Reserve. See Bank of England website, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk (last visited Jan. 15,
2010).
40. Schooner & Taylor, supranote 25, at 624.
41. Id. at 625.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 627-28.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988).
48. Bodie, supra note 37.
49. Craig M. Scheer, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance in the
European Union: Implicationsfor U.S. Banks, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 171, 184-85
(1994).
50. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 627-28.
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the inflation and the subsequent asset-liability mismatch threatened to
cause hundreds of savings & loan failures, Congress partially
deregulated the commercial banking and savings & loan industries. 5 ' It
passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980.5 This Act phased out interest rate caps on commercial
banks and savings & loans and authorized depository institutions
nationwide. 53 It also allowed savings & loans to make consumer loans
up to 20% of their assets, issue credit cards, accept negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts to enable them to compete for funding
with the shadow banking sector, 54 and invest up to 20% of their assets
in commercial real estate loans. Additionally, it allowed savings &
loans to sell their mortgage loans and use the cash generated to seek
better returns; the losses created by the sales were to be amortized over
the life of the loan, and any losses could also be offset against taxes paid
over the preceding 10 years.55 This all made savings & loans eager to
sell their loans. The buyers, major Wall Street firms, were quick to take
advantage of the savings & loans' lack of expertise, buying at 60%-90%
of value and then transforming the loans by bundling them as
government-backed securities by virtue of government sponsored
enterprises (Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Fannie Mae) guarantees.56
Additionally, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 which increased the proportion of assets that
savings & loans could hold in consumer and commercial real estate
loans and allowed savings & loans to invest 5% of their assets in
commercial loans until January 1, 1984, when this percentage increased
to 10%.17
Other changes in savings & loans oversight included authorizing the
use of more lenient accounting rules to report their financial condition,
and the elimination of restrictions on the minimum numbers of savings
51. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I) (1989) (Conf. Rep.); Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989); American
Bar Association, How a Good Idea Went Wrong: Deregulationand the Savings and Loan
Crisis,47 ADMIN. L. REv. 643, 649 (1995).
52. American Bar Association, supra note 51, at 644.
53. Id. at 650.
54. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), supra note 51.
55. Schooner & Taylor, supranote 25.
56. Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to
Fail":BalancingPublic andPrivateInterests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 997-99 (1993). GSE's are
a federally charted, privately owned institution limited by their charters, granted by or pursuant
to an act of Congress, to specific lending. Accountability of Government SponsoredEnterprises:
Hearing Before the J Subcomm. on Capital Markets, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) [hereinafter
Stanton] (statement of Thomas H. Stanton); Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a
Government-SponsoredEnterprise,80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 570-72 (2005).
57. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 627.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss1/2

10

Foster: Too Big to Fail—Too Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should be Add

2010]

TOO BIG TO FAIL - TOO SMALL TO COMPETE: SYSTEMC RISK SHOULD BE ADDRESSED

41

& loans stockholders.5 8 Such policies, combined with an overall decline
in regulatory oversight, would later be cited as factors in the collapse of
the savings & loans industry.
The deregulation of savings & loans gave them many of the
capabilities of commercial banks, without the same regulations. As
savings & loan associations could choose to be under either a state or a
federal charter, immediately after deregulation of the federally chartered
savings & loans, state-chartered savings & loans rushed to become
federally chartered in order to take advantage of the deregulation.
Flushed with deregulated power, the savings & loans leaped at the
chance to increase profit in the real estate boom of the late 1970s.
Unfortunately, many savings & loans lent far more money than was
prudent to risky ventures which many savings & loans were not
qualified to assess. Further, what Congress gave through dereplation it
took away through tax reform. The Tax Reform Act of 19866 removed
tax shelters for real estate investments, significantly decreasing the
value of many such investments which had been held more for their taxadvantaged status than for their inherent profitability. This, in turn,
encouraged the holders of loss-generating properties to try and unload
them, which contributed to the problem of sinking real estate values
which contributed to the end of the real estate boom of the early to mid
1980s and further facilitated the savings & loans crisis.
D. The De FactoDeregulatory Cycle
Starting in the 1980s, a confluence of events led to regulatory
agencies in the United States relaxing or ignoring regulatory
requirements in the financial services sector.6 While commercial banks
and savings & loans were struggling in the 1970s and 1980s to find
revenue generating avenues and to compete with foreign banks that
could generate revenue through the stock markets and insurance
markets, investment banks in the United States were also seeking new
ways to generate revenue and compete with foreign investment banks
that were not constrained with complex regulatory rules and limits. 62

58. Id. at 636.
59. Id.; S. REP. No. 106-154, at S13896-97 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (statements of Senator
Dorgan); I FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s (1997).

60. 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2005).
61.
62.

Wilmarth, supranote 20, at 250.
See id. at 234-35.
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One mechanism to increase revenue with minimal regulatory
oversight was through over the counter (OTC) 63 derivatives, primarily
swap contracts." Although swap contracts are "in the character of'
futures contracts, and thus were under the regulatory purview of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission6 1 (CFTC), the CFTC did not
assert jurisdiction. Still, with the law on the books, the CFTC or a court
could rule the swaps illegal if they did not conform to regulatory
requirements rendering trillions of dollars in OTC derivative contracts
unenforceable.
As with most financial debacles, the commercial banking and
savings & loan crisis in the United States in the 1980s was not caused
by one factor or one person. Rather, it was caused by a variety of factors
and many people, most of whom were sitting in Congress and
regulatory agencies. Commercial bank and savings & loan failures from
1980-1994 numbered around 1,300 or 1,600. The debacle cost tax
payers between $130 billion to over $1 trillion depending on teh set of
"books at which one looks."67 Considering the inadequate preparation
for deregulation and the dire consequences thereof, it is rather surprising
what Congress did next.
Attempts were made to deregulate the financial services sector in
1984, 1988, 1991 and 1995, but each attempt at de jure deregulation
failed. Unsatisfied with the slow, plodding nature of Congress and
concerned with foreign competition, the Federal Reserve Board
(Board), reinterpreted Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed
commercial banks to do up to 5% of gross revenues from underwriting
activities previously only allowed to be done by investment banks.
Then, again in the spring of 1987, the Board allowed commercial banks
to do more investment banking business over the objections of

63. Over the counter markets are transactions between parties and not through an
exchange. Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/over-the-countermarket.asp (last
visited Nov. 14, 2009).
64. THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., OVER THE COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 4-5 (Nov. 1999); Dorit Samuel, The Subprime

Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid Future FinancialDebacles?, 2 ALB. GOV'T
L. REv. 217, 232-37 (2009).
65. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2008).
66. FDIC, supra note 59; Schooner, supra note 25, at 636.
67. Carl Felsenfeld, FinancialInstitutions and Regulations, the S&L Crisis: Death and
TransfigurationSymposium, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. S7, S29 n. 144
(1991).
68. The Glass-Steagall Act, enacted in 1933, prohibited commercial banks from activities
considered too speculative such as underwriting and dealing with securities (investment banking
activities). Michael S. Raab, The Transparency Theory: An Alternative Approach to GlassSteagallIssues, 97 YALE L.J. 603 (1988).
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Chairman Paul Volker. 69 Alan Greenspan became the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board in August, 1987.70 Under Greenspan, the Board
continued to deregulate the financial services sector allowing
commercial banks to do more investment banking business.7 1
As a result of the savings & loan debacle, Congress passed the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
(FIRREA) which changed the savings & loan industry and its regulatory
structure." Briefly, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), a bureau of
the Treasury Department, was created to charter, regulate, examine, and
supervise savings institutions. 73 Additionally, FIRREA gave both
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae additional responsibility to support
mortgages for low- and moderate-income families. 74 In 1991, Congress
also enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) in response to banking problems experienced in
the 1980s. 7 5 This law established a new level of banking supervision,
based on the level of capital, where regulatory agencies could take more
severe action as capital levels decrease and was in accordance with the
international Basel Capital Accord agreement. 76
E. More ForeignDeregulation- The European Union's Second
Banking Directive
The European Union passed the Second Council Directive of
December 15, 1989 (the Second Banking Directive), which member
69.

DAVID ELY & KENNETH ROBINSON, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, FINANCIAL

INDUSTRY STUDIES: How MIGHT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REACT TO GLAss-STEAGALL REPEAL?
EVIDENCE FROM THE STOCK MARKET 3 (1998), http://www.dallasfed.org/banking/fis/fis9801.
pdf; Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 644-46. Citicorp, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1987).
Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1988).
"Thomas Theobald, then vice chairman of Citicorp, argued that three "outside checks" on
corporate misbehavior had emerged since 1933: "a very effective" SEC; knowledgeable
investors, and 'very sophisticated' rating agencies." Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell,
Wandering Along the Road to Competition and Convergence--The Changing CMRS Roadmap,
56 FED. COMM. L.J. 489, 547 n.266 (2004). In the current economic crisis, all three of these
"outside checks" have proven to be fatally defective. Jacob M. Schlesinger, What's Wrong? The
Deregulators,WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at Al.
70. Nathaniel C. Nash, Greenspan Says He'd Sit Out Some FederalReserve Votes, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/11/us/greenspan-says-he-d-sit-outsome-federal-reserve-votes.html. Greenspan had formerly been a director of J. P. Morgan. Id.
71. J.P. Morgan & Co., 75 FED. RES. BULL. 192, (1989); Ely & Robinson, supra note 69,
at 3.
72. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 637.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Practising Law Institute, CapitalAdquacy Ratio (CAR) in the Real World, 7 No. 21
P.L.I. POCKET MBA 1 (June 3, 2009); 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (2009); 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (2009).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (2009).
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states were required to implement by January 1, 1993.77 The directive
established a single license applicable throughout the European Union
for the provision of banking and other financial services. Thus, a credit
institution 78 was able to provide a wide variety of financial services
throughout the European Union. 79 These services include: acceptance of
deposits from the public, lending, trading transferable securities, money
market instruments, options and futures, foreign exchange and exchange
and interest rate instruments, providing investment and financial
advisory services, participating in stock issues and providing services
related to such issues.8 0 In essence, European Union banks could do
commercial banking, investment banking and insurance business.81
The Second Banking Directive was not intended to merely have an
effect in the European Union; it was intended, by design, to pressure
non-European Union countries to reform their financial services laws so
European Union financial services firms would have complete market
access.82 This was done through the comparable treatment
requirement. 8 3 Under the comparable treatment requirement, a third
country whose banks participate in the European Union's banking
market must provide European Union banks with "effective market
access comparable to that granted by the [Union] to credit institutions
from that third country." 84 If it appeared to the Commission that a third
country was not giving European Union banks comparable treatment,
the Commission could submit proposals to the European Union Council
for authority to negotiate with that third country.8 Thus, if European
Union banks were not allowed in a foreign country to do everything
they were allowed to do in the European Union, punitive action was
possible.8 6 Prior to the repeal of Glass-Steagall by the Financial
Services Modernization Act in 2000, the only way the United States
77.
78.
repayable
Directive
1986 O.J.
79.

Second Council Directive, infra note 79.
A "credit institution" is an undertaking "whose business is to receive deposits or other
funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account." First Council
77/780, art. 1, 1977 O.J. (L 322) (EEC) (as amended by Council Directive 86/524,
(L 309) (EEC)).
Second Council Directive 89/646, pmbl., Annex, art. 18, 1989 O.J. (L 386) (EEC);

HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SEcuRITIEs AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW

§

27:75 (2d ed.) (Mar. 2009).
80. Second Council Directive, supra note 79, pmbl., Annex, art. 18.
8 1. Id.
82. Craig M. Scheer, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance in the
European Union: Implicationsfor US. Banks, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 171, 177-78
(1994).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; Second Council Directive 89/646, art. 9, TT 3 & 4, 1989 O.J. (L 386) (EEC).
86. Scheer, supra note 82; Second Council Directive 89/646, art. 9, TT 3 & 4, 1989 O.J.
(L 386) (EEC).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss1/2

14

Foster: Too Big to Fail—Too Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should be Add

2010]

TOO BIG TO FAIL - TOO SMALL TO COMPETE: SYSTEMIC RISK SHOULD BE ADDRESSED

45

could provide European Union banks with comparable treatment was to
liberalize its banking laws to the same extent as the Second Banking
Directive.8 7 If this was not accomplished the European Union could
decide to not allow U.S. financial service firms access to the European
Union market.
F. De Facto DeregulationAccelerates in the United States
After the Second Banking Directive passed in the European Union,
there was an acceleration of deregulation in the United States. In 1989,
the CFTC issued the Swap Policy Statement, which reflected the
agency's view that "most swap transactions, although possessing
elements of futures or options contracts are not ag ropriately regulated
This statement was
as such under the Act [CEA8 8 ] and regulations.
issued to ease concern about the legality of certain derivative contracts
but the CFTC at the time lacked authority to exempt futures contracts
from the provisions of the CEA that required all such contracts to be
traded on contract markets approved by the CFTC in order to be legal. 90
Accordingly, the legal certainty of derivative contracts was an issue.
In 1990, J.P. Morgan became the first commercial bank to receive
permission from the Board to underwrite securities, so long as its
investment banking business did not exceed the 10% limit. This de facto
deregulation was followed by de jure deregulation with the Riele-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which
repealed the 1927 McFadden Act provision limiting interstate banking,
and part of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricting purchase
by one commercial bank of a commercial bank in another state.92
In 1995 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began receiving government
incentive payments for purchasing mortgage backed securities. 93 Thus
began the involvement of the government-sponsored entities (GSE)

87. Scheer, supra note 82, at 201; George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992:
Legal Issues and Policy Implications,31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 463, 496 (1990).
88. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27(f) (1922).
89. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT CONCERNING SWAP
TRANSACTIONS 30694 (1989), availableat 1989 WL 278866.
90. See THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTs., OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 6-9 (1999). Such authority was
provided in a limited extent under the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992.
91. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, § 1(a), 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
92. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 643-44.
93. Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed The Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/09/
2008,
AR2008060902626.html.
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with the subprime market. 94 Subprime mortgage originations rose by
25% per year between 1994 and 2003, resulting in a nearly 10-fold
increase in the volume of subprime mortgages in just nine years. 95 The
relatively high yields on these securities, in a time of low interest rates,
were very attractive to Wall Street, and while Fannie and Freddie
generally bought only the least risky subprime mortgages, these
purchases encouraged the entire subprime market. 96
Because of their government connections, investors believed that the
government would not let a GSE fail. This enabled GSEs to leverage at
a rate higher than other financial service institutions and they did.9 7
From 2002 to 2006 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined purchases
of subprime securities rose from $38 billion to around $175 billion per
year before dropping to $90 billion. During this time, the total market
for subprime securities rose from $172 billion to nearly $500 billion
only to fall back down to $450 billion.9 8
In December 1996, with the support of Chairman Alan Greenspan,
the Board issued a precedent-shattering decision permitting commercial
banks to own investment bank affiliates with up to 25% of their
business in investment banking (up from 10%).99 This expansion of the
Board's 1987 reinterpretation of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall
effectively rendered Glass-Steagall obsolete. However, because GlassSteagall remained on the books there was some legal uncertainty.
In August 1997, the Board eliminated many restrictions imposed on
"Section 20 subsidiaries" by the 1987 and 1989 orders. The stated
justification for this deregulatory move was that the risks of
underwriting had proven to be "manageable."' 00 In 1997, Bankers Trust
bought the investment bank Alex Brown & Co., becoming the first U.S.
commercial bank to acquire an investment bank. 01
In the fall of 1997, Travelers Insurance Company acquired the
94. Subprime lending (near-prime, non-prime, or second chance lending) is a financial
term that was popularized by the media during the "credit crunch" of 2007 and involves
financial institutions lending to borrowers who do not meet prime underwriting guidelines.
95. Cynthia Angell & Norman Williams, U.S. Home Prices: Does Bust Always Follow
Boom? (2005), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyil2005/021005fyi.html.
96. Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122298982558700341.html.
97. Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80
WASH. L. REv. 565, 570-72 (2005).
98. Id.
99. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 645; 61 FED. RES. BULL. 68, at 750 (1996);
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 62 Fed. Reg. 2622-32 (proposed Jan.
17, 1997).
100. Bank Holding Companies and Changes in Bank Control, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,295 (1997)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
101. FinancialRestructuring: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial
Services, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of the Independent Bankers Association of America).
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Salomon Brothers investment bank for more than $9 billion in stock.102
This acquisition was justified as giving Travelers the wealth necessary
to compete overseas. 03 On April 6, 1998, Travelers and Citicorp
announced a $70 billion stock swap merging Travelers and Citicorp (the
parent of Citibank), to create Citigroup, Inc., then the world's largest
financial services company, in what was the biggest corporate merger in
history. 104
The Board gave its approval to the Citicorp-Travelers merger on
September 23, 1998.105 The Board's press release indicated that "the
Board's approval [was] subject to the condition that Travelers and the
combined organization, Citigroup, Inc., take all actions necessary to
conform the activities and investments of Travelers and all its
subsidiaries to the requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act in a
manner acceptable to the Board, including by divestiture as necessary,
within two years of consummation of the proposal."' 06 The Board's
approval was also subject to the condition that Travelers and Citigroup
conform the activities of its companies to the requirements of the GlassSteagall Act. 0 7
G. De Jure Deregulation
In May 1998, the House passed legislation by a vote of 214 to 213
that allowed for the merging of commercial banks, investment banks,
and insurance companies into huge financial conglomerates. 0 8 In
September, the Senate Banking Committee voted 16-2 to approve a
compromise bank overhaul bill. 09 Then, after 12 attempts in 25 years,
and incremental de facto deregulation, Congress repealed Glass-Steagall
and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 with the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 2000 (FSMA), formerly known as the
Financial Services Competition Act of 1997.110 Financial service firms
102. Peter Truell, A Wall Street Behemoth: The Deal; Travelers to Buy Salomon, Making a
Wall St. Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/25/
business/a-wall-street-behemoth-the-deal-travelers-to-buy-salomon-making-a-wall-st-giant.html
?pagewanted=1.
103. Id.
104. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 25, at 645 n.235.
105. Id.; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving
Formation of a Bank Holding Company, and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities (Sept.
23, 1998) (available in LEXIS, Federal Legal-U.S./Administrative Agency Materials/Individual
Agencies File) [hereinafter Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.].
106. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 105.
107. Id.
108.

144 CONG. REC. H3201-H3222 (1998).

109. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, Committee Documents,
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/hr10/hrl0rprt.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
110.

144 CONG. REC. E1054-E1056 (1998); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
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in the United States were now allowed to do what their European Union
brethren were allowed to do under the Second Banking Directive.I'
The main goal of the legislation was to repeal the provisions of the
Glass Steagall Act that restricted commercial banks and investment
banks from affiliating so they could compete globally.112
But de jure deregulation was not complete in the United States. In
November, 1999 the President's Working Group recommended the
deregulation of the derivatives market based upon the legal uncertainty
of the law." 3 In June, 2000 then Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence
Summers testified before joint Senate committees on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs that
there was a need for legal certainty for derivative contracts; that U.S.
markets were outdated compared to European Union markets; that
certain derivatives should be excluded from regulatory oversight; and
that the United States needs deregulation to be competitive." Shortly
thereafter the Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) was
passed by Congress" 5 and signed into law excluding derivatives from
regulatory oversight.' 16
H. The FinancialCrisis Startingin 2007 Leads to Re-Regulation
What ensued following the de jure deregulation in the United States
was about four years of growth in the financial services sector followed
by what some have called a total meltdown of the global credit markets
and the nearest thing we have seen to the Great Depression." 7 What is
86TH ANNUAL REPORT 118 (1999).

111. See 145 CONG. REC. H5322-H5323 (1999); 145 CONG.REC. Sl3883-S13917 (1999).
112. See Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Note and Comment: An InternationalPerspective on
Domestic Banking Reform: Could the European Union's Second Banking Directive
Revolutionize the Way the UnitedStates Regulates its own FinancialServices Industry?, 14 AM.
U. INT'L L.R. 1715, 1739-40 (1999); see generally Financial Services Competitiveness Act of
1997, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1998) (The Bill's synopsis is "to enhance competition in the
financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks,
securities firms, and other financial service providers, and for other purposes.").
113. THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/release/

reports/otcact.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
114. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers
Testimony Before the Joint Senate Committees on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (June 21, 2000), availableat http://www.treas.gov.oress/
releases/1s722.htm.
115. 145 CoNG.REC.HI2502(1999); 146CONG.REC.S11885(1999).
116. Dean Kloner, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 29 SEC. REG. L.J.
286, 290 (2001); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET.AL., JoINT REPORT ON RETAIL
SwAPS: As REQUIRED BY SECTION 105(c) OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF

2000 1-2 (2001), availableat http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/rssfinal.pdf.
117. Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y.
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truly surprising is not that this happened but that so many "experts" did
not see it coming. There were certainly enough voices of concern raised
before the fall for those involved in the government and financial
services sector to understand the vulnerabilities and avoid the
meltdown. For example, when the FSMA was being debated in
Congress, Representative John Dingell reminded the House of the dire
repercussions the last time Congress deregulated (the savings & loan
industry) and feared this would happen again with rampant speculation
ending in a public bail-out." 8 Further, there were examples of housing
bubbles and deregulatory chaos in other foreign markets." 9 Congress
flew past these concerns and the financial services market did soar ever
higher but only for a short time; ultimately financial service institutions
fell back to earth creating harm and havoc on their way down.
The causes of the crisis are numerous: financial service firms were
over leveraged,12 0 poor risk analysis regarding debts and assets,' 2 ' lack
of regulatory oversight,122 greed,123 and hubris.124 As with the Great
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al, available at www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html?em.
118. 145 CONG. REc. H5219 (1999). Rep. Dingell stated:
It looks like this Congress is setting out to create exactly the same situation
which caused the 1929 crash . . . Congress is setting out to create the

situation that caused the collapse of the banks in Japan and Thailand by
setting up . . . monstrous conglomerates which will expose the American
taxpayers and American investors to all manner of mischief and to the most
assured economic calamity .... First of all, it allows megamergers to create
monstrous institutions which could engage in almost any sort of financial
action. It sets up essentially, devices like the banks in Japan, which are in a
state of collapse at this time, banks in Korea and Thailand, which are in a
state of collapse, or banks in the United States, which could do anything and
which did anything and contributed in a massive way to the economic
collapse of this country in 1929 which was only cleared and cured by World
War II.
119. See generally Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank Failures in Mature
Economies (Bank for Int'l Settlements Working Paper No. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbswpl3.pdf.
120.

INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/

external/pubs/ft/ar/2009/eng/pdflar09_eng.pdf.
121.

BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REvIEw: INTERNATIONAL BANKING

AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 5 (2008), availableat http://www.bis/org/publ/qtrpdf/

rqt08O9.htm; Edward Carr, In Plato'sCave, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2009, at 13.
122. Press Release, Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Recommendations for
Reorganizing U.S. Regulatory Structure (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.
org/press.html.
123. Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction - Structured Finance and Credit Market
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 54 (2009).
124. See generally Paul Krugman, How Did the Economists Get it so Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2009, at MM 36.
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Depression people are again calling for regulatory oversight of the
financial services sector to avoid the excesses and speculation of an
unregulated financial services industry. 12 5 So we go into another cycle
of regulation; but what happens when we yet again go into the
deregulatory cycle? Will we again ignore past experiences with
deregulation and be doomed to repeat our mistakes? Probably, but one
thing we can do is minimize the damage and one way to do that is
through antitrust actions to divest the too big to fail firms into smaller
firms for which failure is acceptable.
III. THE ANTIDOTE TO Too BIG TO FAIL Is ANTITRUST
As a preliminary matter it must be said that the financial services
sector is not exempt from antitrust laws. More critically, however, is
that there is nothing in antitrust statutory law nor case law that would
prevent the use of systemic risk analysis for purposes of divesting a firm
that is too big to fail or preventing a merger. Antitrust has always been
available as an antidote for too big to fail through divestiture and
merger review; however, some believe that antitrust law would have to
be reformed before it is applicable.' 2 6 That is simply not the case.
A. FinancialService Firms are not Exemptfrom Antitrust Laws
Antitrust law is clearly applicable to commercial banking.127
Investment banking may have a partial, implied exemption because of:
"(1) the existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to
supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible
regulatory entities exercise that authority; and (3) a resulting risk that
the securities and antitrust laws, if both applicable, would produce
conflictinf guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of
conduct." 28 This does not appear to pose a problem for Sherman § 2
nor Clayton § 7 application to systemic risk.
125. See U.S. Department of State, "London Summit Communiqud: Global Plan for
Recovery and Reform," available at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/resources/125131.htm;
see also President Barack Obama, Remarks on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform (June
17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press-office/Remarks-of-the-Presidenton-Regulatory-Reform/ [hereinafter Obama Remarks].
126. Albert A. Foer, Preserving Competition After the Banking Meltdown, GCP - THE
ONLINE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, Dec. 2008, at 6-7; see generally Daniel J.
Mahoney, "When Bank Mergers Meet Antitrust Law, There's No Competition." Why Antitrust
Law Will Do Little to Prevent Overconsolidation Within the Banking Industry, 14 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 303, 305 (1995).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat'I Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
128. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275-76 (2007).
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With respect to insurance, there is an express federal exemption for
the "business of insurance" if it is also "regulated by State law." 29 So,
to the extent a firm is engaged in all three financial services, it can be
sued for antitrust violations regarding its commercial and investment
banking businesses but there may be an exemption from antitrust law
regarding its "business of insurance" that is regulated by State law.
B. The Origins of Too Big to Fail
The too big to fail doctrine seems to have first been articulated in
the Continental Illinois situation in the early 1980s. In the mid-1970s
the management of Continental Illinois decided upon a growth strategy
that focused on commercial and industrial lending. 3o For the short term,
this growth strategy seemed to work with Continental Illinois's share
prices and return on equity going up.13 1 But this was a risky plan as
Continental Illinois's loan-to-asset ratio was very high.132 This risk, as it
turned out, did not pan out. As Continental Illinois's debtors began to
default, its share prices began to decline and it became apparent that, in
the name of growth, Continental made some bad loans.' Corporations
and large financial institutions with deposits at Continental Illinois, the
seventh largest bank in the nation at the time,134 became nervous about
the stability of the bank and so started to pull out their money.
Regulators feared a bank run and that Continental Illinois's failure
would cause systemic failure as many small banks had deposits at
Continental Illinois and they could fail if Continental Illinois were
allowed to fail. As a result of this concern, the regulatory authorities
stepped in with loans and attempted to find a merger partner. When no
partner was found, the regulators bought Continental's bad debt and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) fully protected all of
Continental Illinois's depositors regardless of the limits on deposit
insurance.135
129. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1013(a) (West 2009); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531, 539 (1978) (citing SEC v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)); see also Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (citing Nat'1 Sec., Inc., 393
U.S. at 459-60).
130.

1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, AN

EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s, at 236 (1997), available

at http://www/fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
13 1. Id.
132. Id. at 239.
133. Id. at 240-41.
134. William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital
Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 1366 (1989); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 140, at
236.
135. Cybil White, Riegle-Neal's 10% Nationwide Deposit Cap: Arbitrary and
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C. Systemic Risk Analysis
Decades after the Continental Illinois crisis there are still no set
rules or formulas for too big to fail; just a patchwork of laws for the
benefit of regulatory agencies to invoke the doctrine when they believe
there is risk of systemic failure.' 3 6 Systemic failure is, in essence, the
domino effect;137 if the insolvent institution in question poses the risk of
taking down other institutions if allowed to fail, and that scenario would
have a significant negative impact on the domestic economy, the
government will step in to prevent the failure of the insolvent
institution.13 8
The bail-out, or public funds funneled into the insolvent too big to
fail institution, is one method the government may utilize to prevent
systemic failure. Another method is merger. Here, the government
regulators find a relatively healthy institution to take over the insolvent
one. When a large bank becomes insolvent in addition to the systemic
failure problem, the potential cost to the FDIC insurance fund may be so
high that the regulators feel compelled to force a merger or provide bailout funding to keep the bank solvent until a permanent solution can be
found.139 In the current economic crisis, the government utilized the
bail-out and forced merger to avoid systemic failure and introduced a
third - systemic risk in bankruptcy reorganization.1 40

Unnecessary, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 347, 354-56 (2005); Kenneth A. Guenther, The Outlookfor
Specialized Institutions in the World of the Too Big to Fail,8 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 467, 470
(1989); Inquiry into ContinentalIllinois Corp. and ContinentalIllinois NationalBank: Hearings
Before the H. Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 172-78 (1984) (statement of C.
Todd Conover); I FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE

FUTURE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s 243-44

(1997), availableat www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
136. Yomarie Silva, The "Too Big to Fail" Doctrine and the Credit Crisis, 28 REv.
BANKING & FIN. L. 115 (2008); see, e.g., 12 U.S.C § 1823(b) (2009) & 12 U.S.C. § 343.
137. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEo. L.J. 193, 198-200 (2008).
138. David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1050-51
(2008); Christopher T. Curtis, The Status of Foreign Deposits Under the FederalDepositorPreference Law, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 237, 247 (2000); Bert Ely, Revisiting an Old
Debate: Do Banks Receive a FederalSafety Net Subsidy?, 18 No. 21 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 14

(1999).
139. Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank
Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 146 (1986).
140. Corporate Bankruptcies in America: The Boom in Busts, ECONOMIST, July 4, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 12851000; Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform
Takes an Extended PhiladelphiaNational Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595,
605 (2008).
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D. Will Systemic Risk Analysis Work in an Antitrust Context?
A solution to the too big to fail problem is to consider the possibility
that a firm that is too big to fail is too big to exist.'41 Conventional
wisdom seems to believe that allowing firms that pose systemic risk to
fail, bankrupting them out of existence, is not the proper solution given
the potential dire economic repercussions.142 Perhaps, but that does not
mean that there is no choice but to allow them to exist. If systemic risk
is considered in the antitrust analysis, particularly under Sherman § 2
and Clayton § 7, divestiture may be used to break-up firms that pose
such a systemic risk and mergers involving firms that pose systemic risk
would not be allowed to go forward.14 3
A proposal to include a systemic risk analysis in antitrust law seems
to be rather controversial with some arguing that it cannot be done
under current antitrust law.'" Such a conclusion seems to be based, in
part, on an assumption that, in order to have violated Sherman § 2 or
Clayton § 7, a defendant must have a certain level of market share or the
market must be highly concentrated. Neither statutory law nor case law
limits antitrust analysis in such a fashion. 145 Indeed, the primary policy
behind antitrust law in the United States is to promote free markets and
eliminate anticompetitive practices.14 6 A systemic risk analysis allows
for the fulfillment of this policy.
E. Systemic Risk Analysis and Sherman § 2
Sherman § 2 provides, in pertinent part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, . . .
The verb "monopolize," as used in Sherman § 2, means to
improperly obtain a dominant position in the market so as to exclude
actual or potential competition. "Practice short of complete monopoly
but which tends to create a monopoly and to deprive the public of the
141. Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIc, May 2009, at 10.
142. Silva, supranote 136, at 122-23.
143. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the New York Bar
Association Annual Dinner: Implications of the Financial Meltdown for the FTC (Jan. 29,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/roscb/090129financialcrisisnybarspeech.pdf
[hereinafter Rosch Statement].
144. Id. at 8-9.
145. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-22 (1962).
146. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991).
147. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2004).
148. Cape Cod Food Prods. v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 906 (D. Mass.
1954).
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advantages from free competition in interstate trade offends the policy
of the Sherman Act."l 4 9
The Supreme Court has held that a person may have "monopolized"
under Sherman § 2 if it is established that there is: (1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident. 5 0 This Article focuses on the first prong of this
test; monopoly power, as the second prong does not need to be
determined using a systemic risk analysis.
"Monopoly power" 151 has been defined as "the power to control
prices or exclude competition" and may be inferred from a predominant
market share.152 This power to control prices or exclude competition has
often been called market power,' 53 so one may have monopoly power if
one has sufficient market share to infer market power. Market share is
determined by ascertaining the percentage of control of a product
(product market) within a specified geographic area (geographic

market).15 4
Although case law allows the inference of monopoly power from
market share evidence, market share is merely a surrogate for monopoly
power because monopoly power is difficult to determine.'
So if a
person has a sufficient market share, it may be inferred that he has
monopoly power giving him a dominant position in the market so as to
have the power to control prices or exclude actual or potential
competition in violation of Sherman § 2. But is there another way to
prove monopoly power as defined by the Supreme Court? Case law is
silent on an alternative approach, but does not preclude the possibility.
F. Too Big to Failand Monopoly Power
As a matter of economic reality, when a firm creates a systemic risk
it is deemed too big to fail and the government intervenes with public

149.
F. Supp.
150.
151.

Ala. Sportservice, Inc. v. Nat'l Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc., 767
1573, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
Monopoly power and market power are terms that appear to be used interchangeably

by courts and commentators. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 272-73 (3d ed.) (2005).

152.

Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571; United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co.,

351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 79, 81 (3d ed.) (2005).

153. HOVENKAMP, supra note 151, at 272-75.
154. Id. at 83.
155. Id.at 80-81.
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funding, merger approval, and expedited bankruptcy. "6Conversely, any
competitors not too big to fail are allowed to fail and are thus excluded
from competition.
Further, a firm that is too big to fail has an
improper competitive advantage that is likely to result in the control of
prices and exclusion of competition in that it can take greater risks than
other firms without suffering the consequences of poor judgment. 15 8
Such a situation does not promote efficiency, nor is it the type of "risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth."l 5 9 If monopoly
power is indeed required for a Sherman § 2 violation, it would be
difficult to assert that a firm that is a systemic risk does not have
monopoly power when it can have such a direct impact on prices and
competition.
G. Systemic Risk Analysis Allows for Price Control
If we are to continue defining monopoly power as the power to
control prices or exclude competition, the first thing we must ask is
"Does a systemic risk analysis establish a tendency to be able to control
prices?" An institution that is a systemic risk can control prices in some
industries because consumers know that that institution will not fail, and
hence will be around to service a product or, in the case of financial
services, will be there to pay accounts. Let us look at two examples
from the current economic crisis, General Motors and Bank of America.
In the General Motors case, the too big to fail argument rested, in
part, on the argument that failure in terms of filing for bankruptcy was
not an option because, even under Chapter 11 reorganization,
consumers would not buy a GM car if they thought GM might not be
there to honor warranties.' 60 While GM did ultimately file for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 reorganization after receiving bail-out
funds, it did so with the government's assistance to ease the process, the
government's guarantee of warranties to ease consumer fears, and the
156. Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended
PhiladelphiaNationalBank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 605, 694-95 (2008).
157. In a free market, private parties are allowed to compete without government
intervention. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law - Balancing Profit Maximization and
Public Access to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 11 (2002); Walter Adams &
James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 257, 282 (1995); David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in
Campaign Finance,9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 236, 240 (1991).
158. Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction - Structured Finance and Credit Market
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 72 (2009).
159. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
160. America's Car Industry: And Then There Were Two, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 20820175.
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government's cash for clunkers program to help sales postbankruptcy. 16 The other two domestic automobile manufactured in the
United States, Ford and Chrysler, received similar governmental
assistance while international competitors such as Honda and Toyota do
not seem to be considered for bail-out monies, government guarantees
of warranties, or bankruptcy preferences. How does this affect the
ability to control price? With the government providing support, GM
sales managed to improve despite all of its financial problems while
Toyota and Honda sales declined. 16 2 Such government intervention offsets the cost of doing business for GM thus allowing GM to sell its
product at a lower price than its competitors without similar government
subsidies. There is a plethora of evidence that government subsidies
enhance a firm's ability to control price.163
As for the Bank of America example, once again we have the price
controlling phenomenon of government subsidization of the too big to
fail firm.
Specifically, a year after Bank of America received its
government subsidy for being a systemic threat to the economy it raised
its fees to its customers while smaller banks that were not subsidized by
the government had to lower their fees in order to compete because
customers would rather deal with a too big to fail bank than one the
government would let fail."'
H. A Too Big to FailFirm May Eliminate its Competitors
Certainly, a too big to fail firm has a competitive advantage in that it
is, in essence, insured or subsidized by the government so it will not be
allowed to fail. For example, in the financial services sector from
January 1, 2009 to October, 2009, 89 FDIC financial services firms
161. Warrantee
Commitment
Program,
www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/
warranteecommitment program.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010); Car Allowance Rebate
Program, Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2009, Pub. L. 111-32; Ken Bensinger & Jim
Puzzangher, "Cashfor Clunkers" Gives a Boost to July Auto Sales, Cm. TRI., Aug. 4, 2009.
162. Andrew Ganz, May Sales: GM, Ford Surprisingly Strong While Honda, Toyota
Falter, LEFT LANE, June 2, 2009, http://www.leftlanenews.com/may-2009-sales-figures.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010); VOA News, Major Automakers' US Car Sales Plunge in May,
VOA NEWS, June 2, 2009.

163. Frank A. Seminerio, A Tale of Two Subsidies: How Federal Support Programsfor
Ethanol and Biodiesel can be Created in Order to Circumvent Fair Trade Challenges Under
World Trade OrganizationRulings, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 963, 973 (2008); Ved P. Nanda,
Selected Aspects of International Trade and the World Trade Organization'sDOHA Round:
Overview and Introduction, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255, 265 (2008); Andrew Green, You
Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, EnvironmentalLaw, and Social Norms, 30 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 407, 408 (2006).
164. David Cho, Banks "Too Big to Fail" Have Grown Even Bigger, WASH. POST, Aug.
28, 2009.
165. Id.
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have been allowed to faill 66 while too big to fail financial institutions
were bailed-out with public funds and allowed to buy failing institutions
with public bail-out money further exacerbating the concentration level
problem.167 When the empirical evidence so clearly establishes an
elimination of competitors that is not a natural consequence of
efficiency, innovation, and free market forces but rather an unfair
competitive advantage a market share analysis is not necessary. 68
Accordingly, a firm that is too big to fail may violate Sherman § 2
because it has unacceptable monopoly power. Further, from a broader
antitrust policy point of view, too big to fail firms skew the free market
due government intervention. More could be done to promote a free
market by utilizing antitrust law to eliminate systemic risk than by
attempting to manage the risk through regulation.1
I. Mergers Under Clayton § 7 and Too Big to Fail
In enacting Clayton § 7 and its amendments, Congress was
concerned with arresting concentration trends before they became a
problem sufficient to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.170
"Thus, a merger may violate § 7 of the Clayton Act merely because it
poses a serious threat to competition and even though the evidence falls
short of proving the kind of actual restraint that violates the Sherman
Act .... .171 Clayton § 7 provides, in pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
166. FDIC, Failed Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
167. Cho, supra note 164.
168. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
169. Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation,and the Newly Liberated Marketplace,75
CAL. L. REv. 1005, 1006-07 (1987).
170. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (Stewart J., dissenting).
171. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 125 (1986).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914) (emphasis added).
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"Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen
competition,' to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not
certainties."' 73 It is a "prophylactic measure"1 74 intended to prevent the
anticompetitive effects in their incipiency.' 7 5 While Congress did not
specify any test to be used in determining whether a proposed merger
may substantially lessen competition,176 courts have recognized the
relevance of economic data,177 including market share,17 1 and
concentration levels.' 7 9 However, statistics concerning market share and
concentration levels are not conclusive indicators of anticompetitive
effects.' 8 0 Rather, a merger has to be viewed functionally, in the context
of its particular industry 81 and take into account a particular market's
structure and history.' 82
The method of determining market share has already been discussed
above. Market concentration may be determined by a dramatic increase
in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as articulated in the U.S.
Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 1.5 (1997. 18s However, the
Merger Guidelines are not binding upon courts. 84 Further, "the
Guidelines neither dictate nor exhaust the range of evidence that the
Agency must or may introduce in litigation."' 85
173. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323.
174. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977).
175. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); Rosch statement, supra
note 143.
176. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22.
177. Id. at 322 n.38.
178. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970); Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22; United States. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,498 (1974).
179. Phillipsburg Nat'1 Bank, 399 U.S. at 350; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22; Gen.
Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498.
180. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv.
L. REV. 937, 947-52 (1981).
181. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22; Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498.
182. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 322 n.38.
183. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures of market concentration by squaring the
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. For
example, for a market consisting of four firms with shares of thirty, thirty, twenty and twenty
percent, the HHI is 2600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 2600). Markets in which the HHI is between
1000 and 1800 points are considered to be moderately concentrated and those in which the HHI
is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be concentrated. Transactions that increase the HHI
by more than 100 points in concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission. See U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 1.51 (1992) (revised 1997).
184. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
185. U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1
(1992) (revised 1997).
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The problem with merger analysis when it comes to the financial
services sector is that there has been little Court guidance in this area
since PhiladelphiaBank' 86 in 1963 and Connecticut NationalBank 87 in
1974. Economic realities have greatly changed since the Court has
expressed an opinion in these cases. From the 1970s through 2000
banking has changed from a "cluster of [banking] products" 88 in
limited regions to one stop shopping financial services supermarkets
that are nationwide and, in some cases, worldwide.189 Despite this
change in economic realities, regulatory agencies have continued to
review mergers in the financial services sector, as if we still had
"banks" with a simple cluster of banking products, conducting regional
business as in the days of yore.190 This has resulted in questionable
economic data input for market share and concentration level analysis
and the approval of many mergers, which has, in turn, increased
concentration levels'91 and resulted in the creation of firms that are too
big to fail.1 92 Nothing in the statutory or case law requires a court to
blind itself to these economic realities. 93
J. Systemic Risk Analysis
It has been argued that the mere fact that a firm's failure is likely to
cause a catastrophic effect on the market should be enough to find a
substantial lessening of competition.194 This holistic approach may
negate the need to determine the relevant market due to the nature of the
systemic failure causing cross-market reductions in competition. Thus,
if there is systemic risk there is a probability of a violation of Clayton §
7. But the Supreme Court in Brown indicated that it was critical to
determine the relevant market in order to determine if there is a
probability of a substantial lessening of competition.' 9 Accordingly, it
186.
187.
188.
189.

United States v. Phila. Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
United States v. Conn. Nat'1 Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
Id. at 664.
Sharon E. Foster, FireSale: The SituationalEthics of Antitrust Law in an Economic

Crisis, 78 Miss. L.J. 777, 784-87 (2009).
190. See, e.g., Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and Other
Nonbanking Activities (June 5, 2008); see also Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings
Association and an Industrial Loan Company (Nov. 26, 2008).
191. Wilmarth, supranote 20, at 250-54.
192.

DAVID BALTO, RESTORING TRUST IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (Center for American

Progress) (May 2009).
193. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 662.
194.

Rosch Statement, supranote 143; Interview by Antitrust Newsmaker with J. Thomas

Rosch, Comm'r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/090126abainterview.pdf.
195. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 n.41 (1962).
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may still be necessary to identify the product and geographic market.
Although the structure of the U.S. banking market has certainly
changed since PhiladelphiaBank,'16 the Court there broadly defined the
product as "various kinds of credit" and services.19 7 Economic reality
would dictate that this would now include investment banking,
commercial banking, and insurance. Because the assets held by a
financial services institution is a measure of the credit and services it
can extend, courts should consider, for product identification purposes,
the assets held by a financial services firm in the relevant geographic
market. 9 9
As for the geographic market, the Court in PhiladelphiaBank held
that this is the area where the bank operates and the customer can
reasonably turn for services.' 99 Currently, the three largest financial
services firms in the United States, .P. Morgan, Bank of America, and
CitiGroup, do business through-out the United States. 200 These three
firms control approximately 44% of the financial services assets in the
United States.
This is especial
significant given the fact that
concentration levels are growing.
Further, there is already some
evidence that this size market share has substantially effected
competition as the larger banks can, and have, raised prices (fees) to
their customers with impunity. 203 Smaller banks cannot compete
because they have to pay more to borrow money and do not have the
"safety net" of too big to fail.20 4 The concern of over concentration
meant to be addressed by Clayton § 7 has been realized. 205 Finally,
Clayton § 7 was intended to be prophylactic. As we can see, systematic
196. Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 250.
197. United States v. Phila. Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963).
198. See Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and an Industrial Loan
Company (Nov. 26, 2008).
199. Phila. Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. at 359.
200. Statistical Release, Fed. Reserve, Insured U.S. - Chartered Commercial Banks That
Have Consolidated Assets of $300 Million or More, Ranked by Consolidated Assets as of June
30, 2009 (June 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/br/current/default.
htm.
201. Id.
202. Last year the same three banks controlled approximately 30% of financial service
assets in the United States. Statistical Release, Fed. Reserve, Insured U.S. - Chartered
Commercial Banks That Have Consolidated Assets of $300 Million or More, Ranked by
Consolidated Assets as of June 30, 2008 (June 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/1br/2080630/default.htm.
203. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANK FEES: FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS
COULD BETTER ENSURE THAT CONSUMERS HAVE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO
OPENING CHECKING OR SAVINGS ACCOUNTS (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d0828 1.pdf; Cho, supra note 164.
204. Cho, supra note 164.
205. Wilmarth, supranote 20, at 250-54.
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risk problems may cause an increase in concentration levels, a reduction
in competition and an increase in prices. Accordingly, systemic risk
analysis is a factor that should be considered in a merger review.

IV. THE ANTITRUST

ANTIDOTE FOR Too
BIG TO FAIL IS UNLIKELY TO WORK IF
THE END RESULT IS DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SERVICE
FIRMS THAT ARE Too SMALL TO COMPETE IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

There is no doubt that de facto and de jure deregulation of the
financial services sector in the United States was based, in part, on a
reaction to foreign competition concerns. The history of de facto
deregulation establishes a parallelism of behavior with regulators in the
United States allowing financial service firms to conduct more
questionable business in order to compete with their under regulated
European counterparts. For example, the 1989 CFTC Swap Policy
Statement, effectively deregulating most swap transactions, came out
the same year as the European Union's Second Banking Directive
which deregulated European Union financial services firms. Then, there
was the permission granted to J.P. Morgan in 1990 to conduct
investment banking along with its commercial banking business which
European Union commercial banks were allowed to do under the
Second Banking Directive; or perhaps the example of de jure
deregulation in the United States in 1994 with the passage of the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act allowing
commercial banks to engage in interstate banking similar to commercial
banks in the European Union being allowed to do cross border banking
under the Second Banking Directive.
One may argue that such parallelism of behavior is insufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish the connection between
deregulation in the United States and the European Union. Perhaps, but
then again there is more direct evidence. During the 1990s the
congressional record is replete with comments regarding the urgency in
passing financial services reform repealing Glass-Steagall so financial
services firms in the United States could compete with foreign
competitors. 206 Additionally, law review articles addressed the issue of
foreign competition in financial services 20 7 and some called for
206. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H3122 & H3124 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. H3133, H3135,
H3137-38, H3140, H3142-43 (1998); 145 CONG. REc. S4737, S4742-43 (1999); 145 CONG. REC.
HI1515, H11519-23, H1l525, H11527-28, H1l533-34, H11536-38, H11543-45, H11547-48,
HI 1550 (1999).
207. Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 234-35.
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deregulation in the name of international competition. 20 8
Given the regulatory-deregulatory merry-go-round pattern that
appears on a domestic and international scale, there is cause to be
skeptical about a long term resolution to the financial crisis based,
primarily, upon domestic re-regulation. What is needed is an
elimination of systemic risk through divestiture and merger review but
this must be done on an international level or it will not be done at all.
A. InternationalCompetition and Too Big to Fail
Let us assume, hypothetically, that antitrust law in the United States
does address the too big to fail problem, and through divestiture and
refusal to allow certain mergers to go through, reduces the too big to fail
financial services firms to a manageable size. Domestic systemic risk is
solved, but what about international competition and systemic risk?
The U.S. financial services sector has contributed significantly to
the domestic economy over the years and its ability to do so in the
future may be hampered by its inability to compete with foreign
financial services firms that are too big to fail. 20 This is the very
concern that contributed to the deregulatory cycle and ultimate financial
meltdown. Given the domestic economic ramifications and the
interconnectedness of the global economy2 0 it is unlikely that the
United States can go it alone - use antitrust law to break-up its
financial services sector when other countries fail to do so.
The antitrust authorities and courts in the United States could use
antitrust laws on foreign firms that are too big to fail in merger
approvals under the doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction, '
preventing financial services mergers that cause an effect in the United
States, but this is a very contentious course of action. 2 12 If antitrust, as
208. Wagman, supra note 20, at 1005.
209. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 34-36 (2007).
210. See Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Address at the 2008 International Research Forum on Monetary Policy: Global Economic
Integration and Decoupling (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080626a.htm; see also Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of
Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Central Bank of Argentina 2008 Money
and Banking Conference: The United States in the International Financial System: A Separate
Reality? Resolving Two Puzzles in the International Accounts (Sept. 1, 2008), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/krosmer20080901 a.htm.
211. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Gushi Bros. Co. v. Bank of Guam, 28 F.3d 1535, 1543-44 (9th Cir. 1994); Sharon E.
Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition Laws Based Upon the
European Union, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 467, 487-89 (2001).
212. Foster, supra note 211, at 485-86; Jeffrey M. Peterson, Unrest in the European
Commission: The Changing Landscape and Politics of International Mergers for United States
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an antidote is going to work, it must be done on an international scale.
B. HarmonizedAntitrust (Competition)Law
Harmonized antitrust law would require an international agreement
whereby the parties accept a uniform international antitrust law. 2 13 The
concept of harmonized antitrust law takes us down a road well traveled
but not well received.2 14 During most of the 1990s the United States and
European Union discussed the concept but had little agreement. The
United States preferred a course of cooperation and coordination
between competition authorities rather than harmonization. 215 The
reason for the reluctance was based, in part, on the differing economic
conditions of the various states and issues of sovereignty regarding
domestic economic policy.216 From 2000 to the present there has been
little further discussion on the topic.
It is unlikely that the difficulties of the past relating to harmonized
antitrust law could be overcome today; however, it is possible to have
partial harmonization where there is an international agreement to
integrate systemic risk analysis in domestic antitrust laws. There seems
to be international consensus that systemic risk must be avoided.217 The
financial meltdown caused, in part, by systemic risk, harmed many
domestic economies as well as the global economy. 2 18 It is evident that
a free market cannot exist in an environment where a few firms can
bring the global economy to its knees. 2 19 Accordingly, united action is
necessary. As Benjamin Franklin once said, "We must all hang together,
or assuredly we shall hang separately." 22 0
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V. CONCLUSION

The financial crisis of 2008-2009 has generated a considerable
amount of discussion in both the popular press and academia. One
obvious solution to this complex problem is to eliminate systemic risk
through antitrust divestiture and merger review for systemic risks.
Unfortunately, it would seem that most world leaders are content to
enter, yet again, the regulatory cycle with promises of better regulation,
especially for the too big to fail firms. Regulations may work but what
happens when, somewhere down the road regulators don't regulate?
What happens when there is a change in economic and political
philosophy regarding regulations? Will we, yet again, deregulate? Are
we doomed to a never ending regulatory cycle with similar booms and
busts like the business cycle? Since we have identified a critical
problem of systemic risk is it not advisable to eliminate that risk rather
than hopefully reduce it through regulations?
In the United States, domestic antitrust law does provide a
mechanism to eliminate systemic risk. Systemic risk analysis may be
used to establish power to control prices or exclude competition for
purposes of Sherman § 2 and may be used to show that a merger may
substantially lessen competition as required under Clayton § 7. So, on a
domestic front, antitrust law can eliminate the too big to fail problem
but, as a practical matter, this will never happen so long as other states
refuse to address systemic risk through antitrust laws. It was
international competition that created a lack of regulatory oversight and
financial service firms that are now too big to fail for fear that they
would be too small to compete. Accordingly, unless there is an
international response that too big to fail is too big to exist we shall
continue down this road to Calvary.
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